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Note 
Bringing Dormant GRAS(E) to Bloom: Reviving 
the GRASE Concept for Drugs 
Emily Puchalski* 
INTRODUCTION 
The cost of getting a new drug to market was estimated at 
$802 million in 2003, and more recent estimates have placed 
the cost at $1.3 billion and $1.7 billion.1 Notwithstanding de-
bates concerning the accuracy of these figures, it is clear that 
there is a high and increasing cost associated with getting a 
drug to market.2 Making the commercial drug development 
process even more difficult, the time from initial development 
to use of a drug for patient treatment can be fifteen years.3 In 
addition, of the compounds discovered as potential drugs, only 
approximately one in every ten thousand will actually end up 
as “an approved drug for sale.”4 This expensive and time-
intensive process produces many undesirable side effects in-
cluding a low incentive to develop drugs for diseases primarily 
affecting the poor, difficulty in offering affordable drugs to 
countries of lower- and middle-income levels, drug-access prob-
lems, and competition from foreign countries with quicker ap-
                                                          
© 2013 Emily Puchalski 
*  J.D. Candidate (2013), University of Minnesota Law School. The au-
thor would like to thank Professor Ralph Hall for the idea for this Note and 
the staff and editors of the Journal for all their hard work and dedication. 
 1. Roger Collier, Drug Development Cost Estimates Hard to Swallow, 180 
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 279, 279 (2009) (estimates in U.S. dollars). 
 2. See, e.g., id. (“Most experts agree that the cost of research and devel-
opment in the drug industry — the cost of clinical trials in particular — is ris-
ing significantly.”). 
 3. PHARMA, DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE 
R&D PROCESS 1 (2007), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/ 
files/159/rd_brochure_022307.pdf. 
 4. Omudhome Ogbru, Why Drugs Cost So Much, MEDICINE.NET, 
http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=18892 (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2012). 
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proval processes.5 Such policy concerns have elicited calls for a 
reformation of the drug-approval system.6 
Like most complex problems, one fix-it-all solution does not 
exist.  However, a partial solution may be buried deep in the 
statutory text of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“the Act”).7 
Section 321(p)(1)8 of the Act contains an exemption that could 
avoid much of the costly research and development and ap-
proval processes. Application of § 321(p)(1) could save certain 
drugs from the costs associated with the New Drug Application 
(NDA) required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
get a new drug to market. The statutory provision applies to 
drugs that are “generally recognized, among experts qualified 
by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and 
effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the 
conditions prescribed.”9 Drugs falling within this provision 
have been referred to as “generally recognized as safe and effec-
tive,” or GRASE for short.10 Thus, drugs that have been shown 
to be safe and effective through either scientific experimenta-
tion or through actual usage could avoid the NDA process.11 
Due to the fact that many drugs, once discovered, can be found 
applicable for other purposes and the fact that some drugs are 
                                                          
 5. Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High 
Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 46–47 (2011), available 
at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/biosoc/journal/v6/n1/pdf/biosoc 
201040a.pdf; Andrew Pollack, Medical Treatment, Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2011, at B1 (“Now, executives of device companies say the F.D.A. has 
gone too far in flexing its regulatory muscle, and they worry that a slower, 
tougher approval process in a weakened economy could chill investments and 
cripple innovation. In addition, they say that American patients are being de-
prived of the latest technology because companies routinely seek approval for 
new devices in Europe first.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Thomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Quantifying High Cost of 
Caution May Speed Drug Approval Process, INVESTORS.COM (June 14, 2010, 
6:48 PM), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-perspective/061410-537266-
quantifying-high-cost-of-caution-may-speed-drug-approval-process.htm (dis-
cussing issues associated with providing the sick with access to potentially 
life-saving drugs and calling for a revolutionary change in FDA’s approval tim-
ing process). 
 7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
 8. This Note uses the United States Code statutory citation system and 
not the parallel citation system of the Act. 
 9. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006). 
 10. James T. O’Reilly, GRAS ROOTS: How to Advocate for and Defend 
“General Recognition” of Safety for Food Ingredients and Drugs, FDLI 
MONOGRAPH SERIES, Dec. 2009, at 1, 6. 
 11. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006). 
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based off of products used for centuries safely, the GRASE pro-
vision provides a mechanism to get these kinds of drugs to 
market quicker, as much of the lengthy safety and efficacy 
studies required for an NDA are not necessary for drugs of this 
nature.12 
Despite the potential cost and time-saving benefits of 
GRASE, the standard for getting a drug designated as GRASE 
has been set so high that the provision has fallen out of use.13 
Today, the chances of getting a drug classified as GRASE can 
be equated with the chances of winning the lottery. Knowledge 
of the bleak prospects of obtaining GRASE status has dissuad-
ed drug manufacturers from even attempting to gain GRASE 
status.14 Although the Act has the GRASE provision as a by-
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., Alistair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the 
Drug-Approval Process, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 618 (2006) (discussing 
how “[t]he high cost of drug development favors risk-averse drug-development 
strategies such as creating new formulations, combining already approved 
agents, and making subtle chemical changes . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 
13:33 (3rd ed. 2011) (“Drug GRASE claims are very difficult to win over FDA’s 
objections. An absence of published peer journal articles about a compound ‘is 
proof that the requisite general recognition does not exist.’”); see also JAMES T. 
O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13:34 (3rd ed. 2011) (“As the 
stringency of the NDA review process increased over time, the drug makers’ 
efforts to escape ‘new drug’ status also increased. GRASE remained a defini-
tion toward which courts showed great deference; guided by the Supreme 
Court’s attitude of deferential acceptance, federal judges declined to overturn 
FDA decisions about ‘general recognition’ despite some sophisticated argu-
ments of well-prepared challengers. Some, like the Chief Judge of the First 
Circuit, remarked with surprise that the general recognition ‘exception’ from 
new drug status ‘is not an exception at all.’ The FDA has rarely lost GRASE 
disputes, but did lose one jury case where the opinions of the government’s ex-
perts did not outweigh those of the claimant’s experts.”) (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted); JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 
13:44 (3rd ed. 2011) (“Although the Supreme Court had recognized a narrow 
exception from the stringent requirement that a drug reach GRASE status 
through adequate and well controlled studies, the so-called ‘exception’ is so 
narrow as to be unachievable by virtually all drug products today. Exception is 
taken from the Court’s comment that ‘in some cases general recognition that a 
drug is efficacious might be made without the kind of scientific support neces-
sary to obtain approval of a NDA.’ Finding this Holy Grail is so elusive, in 
light of the FDA’s preference for tangible data, that one should not lightly at-
tempt to claim exemption.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 14. See RICHARD R. ABOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAW 73 (6th ed. 
2010) (discussing how even if a drug has been on the market without FDA ap-
proval for a long period of time, if FDA decides that the drug must be subject-
ed to FDA approval, despite the existence of the GRASE provision in the Act, 
the FDA “will not GRASE a product,” forcing the drug to comply with the NDA 
process despite its long-term safe use). 
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pass for drugs having certain indicia of safety and efficacy, its 
disuse has essentially deleted the provision from the Act. The 
current GRASE system is broken and needs fixing, because for 
all intents and purposes there is no functioning GRASE sys-
tem. A change to the current GRASE system could introduce a 
means for certain drugs to get to market through a quicker and 
less expensive process without losing assurances of the drugs’ 
safety and efficacy. 
This Note examines the GRASE designation for drugs. 
Part I of this Note will describe the history of the Act’s GRASE 
provision. Part II of this Note presents previous proposals for 
lowering the cost and time requirements of FDA’s drug-
approval process. Finally, this Note concludes that the GRASE 
concept should be revived for drugs, and a GRASE Notification 
System should be implemented because this system could lower 
the cost associated with drug development. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
APPLICATION OF GRASE TO DRUGS 
To get a new drug to market, the drug must comply with 
the NDA process; however, the Act provides the GRASE provi-
sion as an alternative process for getting the drug to market 
provided that the requisite showings can be made. Meeting the 
requirements for achieving GRASE status, in fact, means that 
the drug is no longer considered to fit the statutory definition of 
a “new drug.”15 The common sense meaning of a “new drug” 
does not align perfectly with FDA’s statutory definition of a 
“new drug.” Employing the common understanding of the word 
“new” would lead to defining a new drug as a drug that has re-
cently come into existence. However, this is not the meaning of 
a “new drug” for FDA purposes.16 To understand the meaning 
of “new drug,” it is important to recognize that FDA approves a 
drug for a particular use; the Agency does not issue general ap-
provals for drugs.17 The particular use for which a drug is ap-
proved is referred to as an indication; an example would be the 
                                                          
 15. Kurt R. Karst, Marketed Unapproved Drugs—Past, Present and Fu-
ture?, FDALAWBLOG.NET (Feb. 2007), http://www.fdalawblog.net/ 
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/files/marketed_unapproved_drugs_feb_07.pdf. 
 16. 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h) (2011). 
 17. Omudhome Ogbru, Indications for Drugs (Uses), Approved vs. Non-
Approved, MEDICINE.NET, http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/ 
art.asp?articlekey=20732 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
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use of a drug for the treatment of a specific disease.18 Thus, a 
drug with an indication for treatment of one disease would be a 
“new drug” when used to treat a different disease.19 Other ways 
of being classified as a “new drug” for FDA purposes include: 
(1) The newness for drug use of any substance which composes such 
drug, in whole or in part, whether it be an active substance or a men-
struum, excipient, carrier, coating, or other component. (2) The new-
ness for a drug use of a combination of two or more substances, none 
of which is a new drug. (3) The newness for drug use of the proportion 
of a substance in a combination, even though such combination con-
taining such substance in other proportion is not a new drug. . . . (5) 
The newness of a dosage, or method or duration of administration or 
application, or other condition of use prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the labeling of such drug, even though such drug when 
used in other dosage, or other method or duration of administration 
or application, or different condition, is not a new drug.20 
In addition, manufacturers can only market drugs for indi-
cations approved by FDA.21 Ultimately, the importance of hav-
ing a drug approved for different indications relates to the abil-
ity of the manufacturers to promote the drug for the treatment 
of different diseases.22 
To fully understand how the GRASE provision could help 
get certain drugs to market quickly without the loss of safety 
and efficacy assurances, the complex regulatory environment in 
which the GRASE provision operates must be explored. First, a 
historical inquiry into the GRASE provision including both case 
law and legislative history interpreting GRASE will be dis-
cussed. Next, the parallel “generally recognized as safe” 
(GRAS) concept for food additives will be introduced as a vehi-
cle for comparison to GRASE.  Finally, various solutions that 
have been proposed as a means of lowering drug development 
costs will be introduced. 
                                                          
 18. See, e.g., id. (“The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classifies in-
dications for drugs in the United States. Indications for drugs can be classified 
in two categories: (1) FDA-approved, also called labeled indications, and (2) 
Non FDA-approved, also called off-label indications.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The 
Drug Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 362, 366 (2001) (discuss-
ing that in order to promote a drug’s use for a new indication, the manufactur-
er must file a supplemental NDA application with FDA which includes the re-
quirement that the manufacturer perform a phase 4 clinical study). 
 20. 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h). 
 21. Ogbru, supra note 17. 
 22. Id. 
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A. HOW THE GRASE CONCEPT FOR DRUGS ENTERED THE ACT 
The GRASE concept for drugs is enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 
321(p)(1), which defines “new drugs”: 
      (p) The term “new drug” means— 
(1) Any drug … the composition of which is such that such drug is not 
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as 
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommend-
ed, or suggested in the labeling thereof ….23 
The “new drug” concept was not in the original 1906 Food 
and Drug Act.24 Its inclusion came in response to the tragic 
deaths of over one hundred people who had taken a drug 
known as Elixir Sulfanilamide in 1937.25 Before the drug was 
marketed the flavor of the drug was tested while its effect on 
human patients was not studied.26 Thus, the 1906 Act’s failure 
to require a showing of drug safety before its manufacture and 
sale was recognized as a shortcoming only after users of the 
Elixir Sulfanilamide died.27 The Secretary of the Department of 
Agriculture, further illuminating the problem, pointed to the 
existence of scientific literature establishing the hazards of di-
ethylene glycol, an element of Elixir Sulfanilamide, in addition 
to the fact that the toxicity of the Elixir could have been shown 
in “a few simple and inexpensive tests on experimental ani-
mals.”28 
The tragedy prompted the Secretary of Agriculture’s pro-
posal that a premarket safety approval system for “new drugs” 
be added to the Act.29 Then, in 1938, the Act, which contained 
                                                          
 23. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 24. Jay M. Zitter, What is “New Drug” Within Meaning of § 201(p) of Fed-
eral, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p)), 133 A.L.R. FED. 229, 
241–42 (1996). 
 25. Id.; Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 
Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG., June 1981, at 18, avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/ 
SulfanilamideDisaster/default.htm. 
 26. Letter of Transmittal of H.A. Wallace, Sec’y of Dept. of Agric., reprint-
ed in CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A 
STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 1317 (1987) [hereinafter Letter of 
Transmittal]. 
 27. See id. (discussing how the current Act did not require safety testing 
and proposing changes for this lack of pre-market safety testing). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Frederick H. Degnan, Rethinking the Applicability and Usefulness of 
the GRAS Concept, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 553, 556 n.16 (1991); Letter of 
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the new drug concept and the GRASE concept, was enacted.30 
The Act was amended again in 1962 to include a requirement of 
establishing drug effectiveness; this change was also instituted 
after a drug-related tragedy.31 Currently, the Act “sets up a 
scheme whereby any drug that is not a pre-existing accepted 
product must show proof of general acknowledgment by experts 
in the field as to its safety and effectiveness (GRASE),”32 and if 
this could not be shown then the product would be considered a 
“new drug.”33 
Because the amendments establishing the current drug 
approval requirements were instituted at different times, ques-
tions arose as to how drugs in use before the amendments 
should be treated.34 This “grandfathering problem” has effec-
tively produced different classifications of drugs.35 One class in-
cludes pre-1938 drugs, which are those that were in use before 
FDA required premarket safety approval.36 Pre-1938 drugs 
were grandfathered into approval when the 1938 amendment 
was enacted.37 A second group of drugs are those that came af-
ter the 1938 amendment but before the 1962 amendment, and 
thus were not required to show effectiveness data in order to 
get FDA approval.38 Some drugs in the second group were not 
grandfathered into approval and were instead studied by FDA 
for effectiveness while remaining on the market.39 Finally, a 
third group of drugs are those that came after both amend-
ments and thus were subject to both premarket approval and 
                                                          
Transmittal, supra note 26, at 1326. 
 30. Ballentine, supra note 25, at 18. 
 31. Milestones in Food and Drug Law History, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm081229.htm 
(last updated Feb. 9, 2009). The tragedy was associated with thalidomide: 
“Thalidomide, a new sleeping pill, is found to have caused birth defects in 
thousands of babies born in western Europe. News reports on the role of Dr. 
Frances Kelsey, FDA medical officer, in keeping the drug off the U.S. market, 
arouse public support for stronger drug regulation.” Id. 
 32. Zitter, supra note 24, at 242. 
 33. Id. 
 34. O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
 35. See Zitter, supra note 24, at 242. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. KURT R. KARST, MARKETED UNAPPROVED DRUGS—OVERVIEW AND 
FDA ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/MARKETED%20UNAPROVED%20DRUGS-
%20OVERVIEW.pdf 
 39. Id. 
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the effectiveness requirement. This Note focuses on the third 
category. Although the GRASE concept could hypothetically be 
applied to pre-1938 drugs “that have not changed content or la-
bel claims in 70 years,” such drugs “are a very small subset of 
today’s marketed drugs.”40 
If found to be a “new drug,” the drug’s manufacturer must 
file a NDA with the FDA,41 which must be approved before the 
drug can be marketed.42 Being deemed a “new drug” creates 
“responsibility [for] the company seeking to market a drug to 
test it and submit evidence that it is safe and effective. [Then, 
a] team of CDER physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharma-
cologists, and other scientists reviews the sponsor’s NDA con-
taining the data and proposed labeling.”43 A “new drug” classi-
fication, thus, thrusts a product into the expensive FDA 
approval processes and the attendant research and develop-
ment requirements the approval process entails.44 
Because a GRASE classification exempts a drug from filing 
the costly, time-consuming, and research-intensive NDA, “regu-
lations have expanded [the GRASE concept] to mean that the 
requisite recognition has to be based on substantial evidence of 
adequate and well-controlled scientific, medical, and clinical 
investigations, not mere anecdotal evidence or testimonials.”45 
Many of the rules regarding the applicability of GRASE to 
drugs have come out of case law.46 
B. APPLICATIONS OF THE GRASE CONCEPT BY COURTS 
Cases dealing with a contested GRASE drug often result 
when a manufacturer markets a drug that it believes to be 
                                                          
 40. O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 6. 
 41. NDA applications are governed largely by 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredeveloped
andapproved/default.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 44. See, e.g., Zitter, supra note 24, at 242 (“If it is found that a product is a 
‘new drug,’ a New Drug Application must be filed, and unless there is effective 
approval of the application, the FDCA, in 21 USCS § 355, prohibits its intro-
duction into interstate commerce. Accordingly, the definition of GRASE is 
quite significant . . . .”). 
 45. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii) (2011)). 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 242–46 (discussing how different cases have changed 
the understanding of GRASE as applied to drugs). 
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GRASE, and FDA challenges the GRASE classification.47 These 
cases necessarily involve the testimony of dueling medical ex-
perts opining that the drug either does or does not satisfy the 
general recognition requirements of safety and efficacy.48 
In 1958, the first case concerning the GRASE status of a 
drug was decided in Merritt Corp. v. Folsom.49 In the case, Mer-
rit attempted to prevent FDA from a seizure action against its 
drug Clarimycin Anti-Biotic Acne Lotion by contending that the 
drug was GRASE, and thus not a new drug requiring an NDA 
and FDA approval before being marketed.50 Merrit provided 
the court with medical affidavits about the general recognition 
among medical experts that its product was safe for the treat-
ment of acne, while FDA provided medical affidavits to the con-
trary.51 The court found that the drug was not GRASE and 
stated: 
Where there is a genuine difference of medical opinion among the ex-
perts on the question of whether a drug is generally recognized as 
safe for the treatment of a particular disease, it must be concluded 
that the drug is not generally recognized as safe for use in the treat-
ment of that disease.52 
In 1959, a similar approach to establishing that a drug was 
GRASE was applied by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey.53 There the court concluded that “a difference of 
opinion between experts established that a drug did not have 
the general recognition of safety required to take it outside the 
                                                          
 47. See id. (discussing FDA challenging the GRASE status of drugs). 
 48. Zitter, supra note 24, at 242; 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006). 
 49. Degnan, supra note 29, at 573 (citing Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. 
Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1958)). 
 50. Id. (citing Merritt Corp., 165 F. Supp. at 421). 
 51. See Merrit Corp., 165 F. Supp. at 420 (“When viewed in the light most 
favorable to it, plaintiff’s medical affidavits assert that topical neomycin sul-
fate is generally recognized by experts as safe in the treatment of acne, even 
when used over prolonged periods of time. Defendant’s medical affidavits as-
sert that topical neomycin sulfate is not generally recognized as safe by ex-
perts in the treatment of acne, because it has been shown to produce sensitiza-
tion and cross-sensitization to streptomycin, an antibiotic valuable in the 
treatment of serious disease conditions. In addition, that use of neomycin sul-
fate for the treatment of acne is a new use for neomycin sulfate both because it 
has not been generally used for such a disease before and also because pro-
longed administration, which is required in an acne treatment, is a new meth-
od of utilizing the drug.”). 
 52. Id. at 421. 
 53. Degnan, supra note 29, at 573 (citing United States v. Trim Reducing 
Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959)). 
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statutory definition of a new drug.”54 
In regard to what must be shown to establish recognition 
by qualified experts, as required in 21 U.S.C.§ 321(p)(1), courts 
have ruled “that unanimity among experts is not necessary to 
show that a substance is, in fact, GRAS.”55 The relevant expert 
testimony “focus[es] on what the colleagues of the testifying ex-
pert know about the product; their awareness, recognition, and 
acceptance is central to the debate.”56 The scientific experts 
must establish that the proposed dosage and usage of the drug 
are recognized generally in the medical community as safe.57 
These developments have led ultimately to FDA needing 
only to show the existence of a reasonable number of qualified 
experts that question safety and efficacy for new drug status to 
be established.58 Further reducing FDA’s burden for establish-
ing a contested product as a “new drug,” the requisite qualified 
experts can be scientists within the Agency.59 Overall, deferen-
tial standards have made it easy for FDA to combat GRASE 
drug claims.60 
In consideration of the evidence necessary to establish the 
safety requirement for GRASE status, courts have held that 
there must be at least as much safety evidence to get a GRASE 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 574 (citing United States v. An Article of Drug . . . “Furrestrol,” 
294 F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1968)). 
 56. O’REILLY, supra note 13, § 13:32. 
 57. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006) (“Any drug . . .  the composition of which 
is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of 
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .”) (emphasis added); O’Reilly, 
supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the term “safe” is defined by FDA rules as a 
reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists that the substance is 
not harmful under its intended conditions of use). 
 58. Zitter, supra note 24, at 242. 
 59. O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing how the FDA has been given 
“almost absolute power over awarding GRASE status or new drug status”). 
This is further complicated by the culture within FDA which effectively em-
braces hesitant approval and the fact that FDA’s approval for certain drugs 
comes much later than the drug gets approved in other, similarly situated, 
countries. See Henry I. Miller, Is the FDA Innovative?, DEFINING IDEAS (Nov. 
22, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/100081 
(discussing FDA’s risk-averse approach to drug approval decisions). 
 60. See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing how the U.S. Su-
preme Court gave FDA almost absolute powers over awarding GRASE status 
or new drug status). 
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designation for a drug as would be needed to achieve the safety 
requirement for a “new drug.”61 It is important to remember 
that when considering safety, what must be proven is not the 
overall safety of the drug, but the safety of the drug for the par-
ticular use for which it is being offered.62 In addition, the type 
of evidence that must be produced has to be “public and availa-
ble to the scientific community.”63 These studies are indispen-
sable for proving GRASE status because the presence or ab-
sence of peer reviewed articles can serve as a proxy for the 
existence of general recognition of safety and/or efficacy.64 
The requirements for establishing GRASE status favor 
FDA by making it easy for the Agency to prove disagreement 
among experts and by placing a high burden on petitioners for 
providing adequate safety evidence.65 This deference to FDA is 
furthered by other regulations and court decisions. Notably, “a 
change in the target use of the product, a change in the formu-
la, its dilution, the duration of treatment, or even the repackag-
ing of the product” have been deemed sufficient for establishing 
that a drug should be considered a statutory new drug and ac-
cordingly subjected to the NDA approval process.66 In addition, 
a combination of two FDA approved drugs is considered a new 
drug.67 Also helping FDA prevail in GRASE cases is that courts 
defer to the Agency in the name of achieving the public health 
                                                          
 61. Degnan, supra note 29, at 574 (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott 
& Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 609 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973); and United States v. Trim Reducing Aid Ciga-
rettes, 178 F. Supp. 847, 921 (D.N.J. 1959)). 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006). 
 63. Id. (citing United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bentex Ulcerine, 
469 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938 (1973) (“Certainly 
it is not unreasonable that if a drug is generally recognized safe and effective, 
one would find in medical literature over a period of years support for this 
premise from wide experimentation and study.”). See also Bentex, 412 F.2d at 
652; Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1263, 1242–43; United States v. Consolidated 
Midland Corp., 603 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.1979); United States v. An Article of 
Drug . . . “Mykocert”, 345 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
 64. See O’REILLY, supra note 13, § 13:33 (citing U.S. v. Undetermined 
Quantities of Articles of Drug, 145 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D. Md. 2001)). 
 65. See, e.g., ABOOD, supra note 14, at 73 (explaining that even if a drug 
manufacturer can show that its product meets the general recognition of safe-
ty and efficacy requirements of GRASE, FDA will still require safety and effi-
cacy to be proved via an NDA and courts will defer to FDA and not disrupt its 
conclusion). 
 66. Zitter, supra note 24, at 242. 
 67. Id. 
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and consumer protection goals of the Act.68 
All of these factors together force the conclusion that FDA’s 
opposition to a GRASE status application makes obtaining 
GRASE status virtually impossible.69 This pro-FDA environ-
ment has led to drug manufacturers basically abandoning the 
GRASE designation,70 which raises the question of how the in-
centives of drug manufacturing are being affected. 
However, despite judicial deference to FDA, drug compa-
nies can still use GRASE for some over-the-counter drug prod-
ucts.71 This use relies on 21 C.F.R. § 330, which provides for the 
publication of “Over-the-Counter (OTC) Monographs,” that con-
sist of an index of drugs along with usages in medical treat-
ments.72 Drug ingredients listed in an OTC Monograph are rec-
ognized by FDA to be GRASE.73 The argument that follows is 
that the industry could create an OTC drug that complied with 
the specifications and would still be GRASE.74 Also, if the com-
pany wanted to use the drug in a manner different from the 
monograph, there is a process for seeking FDA’s approval of 
this, which could allow for more GRASE uses.75 Another use for 
the industry would be to “take a product that has been [NDA] 
approved, and which has had sufficient experience on the mar-
ket and extensive published literature, and submit a citizen pe-
tition to change its Monograph status to general recognition.”76 
However, in practice, this use is not often invoked.77 Although 
OTC drugs may still be able to use the GRASE provision, this 
Note focuses on prescription drugs. 
                                                          
 68. See, e.g., Zitter, supra note 24, at 242–43. 
 69. O’REILLY, supra note 13, § 13:33. 
 70. See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 8 (“Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott 
& Dunning, gave FDA almost absolute powers over awarding GRASE status 
or new drug status.”) (footnote omitted). Thus, manufacturers have no incen-
tive to attempt to classify a product as GRASE because if FDA disagrees, the 
agency will most probably win. This will result in seizure actions, litigation, 
and time and money lost with the final result of having to go through the NDA 
process, which the manufacturer could just do in the first place. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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C. APPLICATIONS OF THE GRAS(E) CONCEPT IN OTHER AREAS OF 
FDA JURISDICTION 
GRAS, a standard similar to GRASE, applies to food addi-
tives.78 The original interpretation of what GRAS meant for 
food additives was based on the GRASE standard for drugs.79 If 
a food additive qualifies as GRAS then it is not subject to pre-
market review and approval that is required for new food addi-
tives, which is similar to how a drug that is deemed GRASE is 
not subject to the NDA process.80 To be GRAS, and thus not a 
food additive subject to premarket review, a product must be: 
[G]enerally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately 
shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance 
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific proce-
dures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the 
conditions of its intended use.81 
Despite their similar beginnings, GRAS and GRASE have 
diverged in importance.82 The GRAS designation is still used by 
manufacturers to avoid the pre-review and pre-approval for 
food additives.83 In defining what is required to establish a 
GRAS designation, FDA has promulgated regulations to im-
plement GRAS in 21 C.F.R. § 170.3 and 21 C.F.R. § 170.30.84 
                                                          
 78. See, e.g., Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS), FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodIngredientsPackaging/GenerallyRecognizedasSa
feGRAS/default.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Generally Recog-
nized]. There is no effectiveness requirement for food additives, which is why 
the food additive standard is GRAS and not GRASE. 
 79. See Degnan, supra note 29, at 556 (“Borrowing from the ‘new drug’ 
definition enacted in 1938, most of the bills submitted during the eighty-fourth 
and eighty-fifth Congresses used a formulation of the ‘generally recognized as 
safe’ standard for defining a food additive.”). 
 80. Guidance for Industry Frequently Asked Questions About GRAS, 
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformatio
n/GuidanceDocuments/FoodIngredientsandPackaging/ucm061846.htm#Q2 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Guidance]. 
 81. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2006). 
 82. One major factor supporting the relevance of GRAS designations to-
day is the fact that companies still file notices with FDA of food additives they 
have determined as GRAS, while GRASE designations are assessed so defer-
entially to FDA that drug manufacturers do not use the classification. GRAS 
Notice Inventory, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fcn/fcnNavigation.cfm?rpt=grasListing 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter GRAS Notice Inventory] (listing of the 
GRAS notices sent to the FDA since 1998). 
 83. See, e.g., id. (listing all of the GRAS notices sent to FDA since 1998). 
 84. See, e.g., Generally Recognized, supra note 78 (outlining various Code 
of Federal Regulation provisions that have been implemented for dealing with 
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Together, the CFR provisions provide for general recognition to 
be established through either scientific evidence, or if a drug 
was in use before 1958, then general recognition can be estab-
lished through its common usage in food.85 Notably, there are 
differences based on whether the product is claiming to be 
GRAS based on scientific procedures or through experience.86 
Also, there is more FDA infrastructure for dealing with 
GRAS products.87 For example, in the 1970s FDA established 
the GRAS affirmation process in which individuals could ask 
FDA to review a substance to determine if it qualified as 
GRAS.88 Although the affirmation procedure is no longer in 
use, a replacement notification procedure was proposed in 
which one seeking to obtain GRAS status makes its own deci-
sion that its substance is GRAS and then informs the FDA of 
its determination instead of having to apply to the FDA to af-
firm that the substance was GRAS.89 
Overall, this notification procedure has resulted in a GRAS 
designation that is still in use today.90 To make the requisite 
GRAS showing: 
A company develops a chemical or other ingredient for food use. The 
company finds published articles about safety and/or has expert 
statements about safety of the food, and prepares a package of sup-
port. The company mails a “notification” letter to FDA with these at-
tachments. [Then,] [f]or about 93% of these letters, FDA responds 
that it has ‘no questions.’ In these responses to notifications, FDA 
specifically expresses that it is not making a GRAS decision and the 
company can proceed at its own risk.91 
D. THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM 
The incredibly high costs associated with drug develop-
ment negatively impact both consumers, who are subjected to 
high drug prices, and manufacturers who have to make eco-
                                                          
GRAS classifications for food additives). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Guidance, supra note 80. 
 87. See generally id. (noting all of the processes and procedures in FDA in 
relation to getting a GRAS designation). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. There is no formal rule on the notification procedure yet. 
 90. See, e.g., GRAS Notice Inventory, supra note 82 (listing notices sub-
mitted to FDA for GRAS food additives with the most recent listed being Sept. 
28, 2011 when accessed on Nov. 15, 2011). 
 91. O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 12 (bullets omitted). 
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nomic decisions as to which type of drug would produce the 
most revenue for the input costs.92 Thus, many potential solu-
tions have been proposed for lowering drug development costs. 
1. Problems with the Current NDA-Required System 
A large problem with the NDA system exists in the high 
costs and time-intensive nature of the process.93 Although the 
FDA approval process is important for assuring the safety and 
efficacy of drugs on the market, certain drugs may not need the 
NDA process to establish safety and efficacy; however, in the 
current system these drugs are still subjected to the NDA pro-
cess. An example of one such situation is provided by levothy-
roxine products.94 Levothyroxine products were sold lawfully on 
the market without FDA approval for over forty years; howev-
er, questions as to bioequivalence and bioavailability led to 
FDA requiring that the products be approved via an NDA.95 
Abbott, a manufacturer of a levothyroxine product named 
Synthroid, tried to persuade FDA to allow a GRASE designa-
tion for its product that had been used for so many years, thus, 
establishing its safety and efficacy.96 FDA was not persuaded 
and required Abbott to seek approval via the NDA process.97 
Thus, drugs that have certain indicia of safety and efficacy 
are required to go through the costly NDA process even if man-
ufacturers can arguably meet the requirements to obtaining 
GRASE status.98 This system is depriving consumers of safe 
and effective drugs and driving up drug costs.99 
2. Proposed Solutions 
The proposed solutions run the gamut from micro-level 
proposals relating to assistance with prescription pill payment, 
to macro-level proposals for changes for drug manufacturers, 
FDA, or both. This Note focuses exclusively on solutions pro-
posed at the FDA-level. 
                                                          
 92. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
 94. ABOOD, supra note 14, at 73. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining that drug man-
ufacturers pass off expenses associated with getting their drug to market to 
the consumers who purchase the drug). 
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a. Fast-tracking 
FDA began instituting programs in 1987 for fast-track ap-
proval of certain drugs for life-threatening and other serious 
illnesses.100 AIDS advocates, and later cancer advocates, pro-
vided the impetus for the programs.101 Similar programs were 
implemented in the early 1990’s, and eventually the programs 
were formally adopted in the 1997 FDA Modernization Act.102 
Fast-tracking encompasses different programs and initiatives 
that seek to speed up drug research and development while al-
so facilitating increased dialogue between the drug companies 
and FDA.103 Overall, fast-tracking provisions were proposed as 
a means to fill existing gaps in medical treatment where there 
was no treatment currently available or the treatment availa-
ble did not adequately serve all patients.104 
Fast-tracking programs offer several advantages to manu-
facturers.105 For example, fast-tracking provides more commu-
nication with FDA during the research and development stag-
es, which correlates with being able to better predict FDA’s 
ultimate decision.106 In addition, with a fast-track designation, 
a drug application has a greater chance of qualifying for a spe-
cial priority review, a process which shortens the period for 
FDA’s review by four months.107 
The accelerated-approval system uses surrogate end points 
as an attempt to predict the effects of a drug for a certain usage 
at an earlier stage than would be possible otherwise.108 This 
system has allowed many to get access to new drugs sooner.109 
b. Off-label Prescription 
Another method implemented to avoid the high cost of get-
                                                          
 100. Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have They 
Worked?, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503, 503 (1995). 
 101. Thomas G. Roberts & Bruce A. Chabner, Beyond Fast Track for Drug 
Approvals, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2004). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Shulman & Brown, supra note 100, at 503. 
 105. Roberts & Chabner, supra note 101, at 501–02. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 502. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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ting drugs approved by FDA is off-label prescribing of medica-
tions.110 Off-label prescription occurs when a drug is prescribed 
for a use that is not approved by FDA.111 Prescribing of drugs 
off label is commonplace and legal, but it is often done without 
studies supporting the use.112 By prescribing a drug off label, 
doctors are prescribing drugs for uses that have not been stud-
ied.113 Employing this system, drugs approved by FDA for one 
purpose can avoid the cost of both research and development 
and FDA approval for a different use of the drug. 
The balance of the Note explains why FDA should regulate 
GRASE drugs similarly to how the Agency regulates GRAS 
food additives. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The tremendous implications of FDA’s drug-approval pro-
cess affect American society at all levels. FDA’s ability to en-
sure that commercially available drugs are safe supports the 
requirement that manufacturers engage in costly research and 
development.114 However, the assurance of safety and efficacy 
must be balanced against concerns for access to potentially life-
saving therapies.115 In addition, economic concerns weigh on 
this balancing act. This Note recognizes that countless other 
concerns, outside of those enumerated above, affect any pro-
posed solution for achieving a balance. Accordingly, all solu-
                                                          
 110. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking 
the Role of FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (discussing how 
FDA approves a drug for a use, not the drug generally, and FDA plays a “lim-
ited role” once a drug is on the market which has led to off-label prescribing of 
drugs to avoid getting the drug approved for many different uses and dosages 
which would generally require a NDA). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., id. (“Evaluations have shown that off-label use is common . . . 
but often not supported by strong evidence.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 114. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 717, 730 (2005) (discussing how FDA’s role as 
gatekeeper ensures that manufacturers conduct studies showing drug safety 
before the drug is introduced to the market). 
 115. See generally Clayton R. Portell, Note, Live or Let Die: Will the Courts 
Recognize in Terminally Ill Patients a Fundamental Right to Choose Non-FDA 
Approved Drugs or Does the FDA’s Stringent Approval Process Carry Sufficient 
Merit?, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 123 (2008) (discussing how FDA’s regulations 
for getting drugs to market have prevented some with access to treatments 
that could potentially have saved their lives, and ultimately, calling for re-
form). 
PUCHALSKI_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:42 AM 
510 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
tions will likely fall short in some way. However, this Note’s 
goal is to propose one particular solution to the complex prob-
lem that brings the countless conflicting interests close to equi-
librium. This Section first explains why the previously pro-
posed solutions are insufficient for getting drugs to market 
more quickly and for less money without compromising safety 
and/or efficacy. Next, revival of the GRASE concept is proposed 
as a potential solution. 
A. PROBLEMS WITH PREVIOUS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
1. Fast-Tracking 
Despite the promise of fast-tracking and other related pro-
cesses, there are also problems with these methods. One prob-
lem relates to the ability of surrogate endpoints to predict the 
success of a treatment.116 Surrogate endpoints are often used in 
studies supporting approvals based on speeding up the review 
process.117 Surrogate endpoints facilitate shorter study times 
because they provide an indication earlier in time than is 
thought to be predicative of the ultimate endpoint.118 For ex-
ample, a surrogate endpoint in a cancer study could be tumor 
reduction.119 Tumor reduction is not the ultimate endpoint in 
cancer studies, but measuring tumor reduction offers a way to 
study the effects of anti-cancer drugs earlier.120 The use of sur-
                                                          
 116. See, e.g., Arthur Schatzkin & Mitchell Gail, The Promise and Peril of 
Surrogate End Points in Cancer Research, 2 NATURE REV. CANCER 19, 19 
(2002) (discussing the ability of surrogate endpoints, used in cancer studies, to 
accurately predict the actual effectiveness of the drug being studied at produc-
ing prolonged cancer remission, compared to an actual endpoint of cancer 
drugs). 
 117. See, e.g., id. (discussing the use of surrogate endpoints in cancer 
drugs, which are often subjected to an expedited approval process). 
 118. See id. (“Both experimental and observational studies of cancer need 
to have an end point. Traditionally, in aetiological and prevention studies, that 
end point has been the incidence of cancer itself, whereas in therapeutic trials, 
the end point is usually time to cancer recurrence or death. But cancer takes a 
long time to develop in an individual and is rare in the population. Therefore, 
aetiological studies and prevention trials must be large and lengthy to be 
meaningful. Similarly, many therapeutic trials require a long follow-up of 
large numbers of patients. Surrogate end points—markers of preclinical can-
cer or of imminent recurrence—are therefore an attractive alternative.”). 
 119. Thomas R. Fleming & David L. DeMets, Surrogate End Points in Clin-
ical Trials: Are We Being Misled?, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.605, 605 (1996). 
 120. See id. (“In theory, for a surrogate end point to be an effective substi-
tute for the clinical outcome, effects of the intervention on the surrogate must 
PUCHALSKI_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:42 AM 
2013] BRINGING DORMANT GRAS(E) TO BLOOM 511 
rogate endpoints, in cancer and other disease studies, “might 
not be acceptable because the quality of evidence they provide 
on treatment effects or exposure associations is lower than that 
obtained by studying the effects of treatment or exposure on a 
true cancer [or other disease] end point.”121 
Another problem with the various expedited processes is 
policy-related. By moving one drug to the front of the approval 
line another drug is being pushed back. Thus, these processes 
effectively lower the cost for one drug while increasing the cost 
for another.122 In addition, deciding which drugs qualify for ex-
pedited processes involves policy-related considerations, i.e., 
determining what it means to be “serious or life-
threatening.”123 
2. Off-Label Prescribing by Doctors 
Despite the huge savings for manufacturers resulting from 
off-label prescribing of drugs, there are risks associated with 
this method. Most notably, off-label use could have harmful 
impacts on health because drugs are being prescribed without 
being fully studied and established as safe and effective for the 
off-label use.124 A drug that has not been shown to be safe and 
effective before getting to market could cause health conse-
quences reminiscent of the Elixir Sulfanimide or may not work 
at all, and thus waste patient’s time that could be spent pursu-
ing other treatment options. While FDA does have the ability to 
regulate off-label promotion,125 prescription of drugs for off-
                                                          
reliably predict the overall effect on the clinical outcome.”). 
 121. Schatzkin & Gail, supra note 116, at 19. 
 122. This assumes that the longer a drug sits at FDA waiting for approval 
the company cannot sell the drug and thus cannot make money, which just 
costs the manufacturer more to keep things running during the waiting peri-
od. For example, “[p]harmaceutical companies . . . [hate] these delays [in FDA 
approval] because for each extra month FDA took to approve an NDA, a 
pharmaceutical company lost a month in marketing a drug with patent protec-
tion.” James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster 
Food and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administra-
tion?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 261 (2005). However, the patent term exten-
sion granted for the time FDA takes in drug approval may ameliorate at least 
some of these losses. 
 123. See, e.g., Roberts & Chabner, supra note 101, at 502 (describing the 
requirement that a drug seeking fast track approval must be designated for 
treating a “serious or life-threatening illness.”). 
 124. See Stafford, supra note 110, at 1427. 
 125. See Position Statement: Off-Label Use of Medical Products, AM. ACAD. 
ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS (June 2009), http://www.aaos.org/about/papers 
/position/1177.asp (“The FDA regulates the marketing approval or clearance, 
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label uses is common and FDA does not have the authority to 
regulate the actions of doctors,126 raising questions about how 
much FDA can actually regulate off-label use by mechanisms it 
currently employs like monitoring corporate marketing of drugs 
to ensure drugs are not promoted for off-label use.127 
B. REVIVING GRASE DRUGS 
As illustrated by the brief discussion of other macro-level 
solutions, each involves undesirable side effects that could ul-
timately affect the safety and/or efficacy of drugs reaching the 
market. Employing the GRASE concept would reduce the cost 
of getting certain drugs to market, by avoiding the NDA pro-
cess, without ultimately compromising the resultant drug’s 
safety and efficacy. 
1. Description of the proposal for reviving GRASE 
To achieve GRASE status, a drug must be “generally rec-
ognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and ex-
perience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as 
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed.”128 In 
addition, interpretation of this provision has further required 
that the evidence produced be publically available and known 
to the scientific community as published peer-reviewed arti-
cles.129 Thus, any drug achieving GRASE status would have 
demonstrated its safety and efficacy, while avoiding the costly 
FDA approval processes. 
To revive GRASE, FDA could issue a guidance document 
                                                          
labeling, and promotion of pharmaceutical, medical device, and biologic prod-
ucts in the United States. These products may only be labeled, promoted, and 
advertised for the uses that the FDA has approved or cleared.”). 
 126. Id. (“The government has long recognized that physicians may pre-
scribe or administer any legally marketed product for an off-label use within 
the practice of medicine. . . .The practice of medicine is regulated by state 
laws, and surgeons should adhere to all applicable state and federal laws and 
regulations.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 110, at 1427 (“Off-label uses have not 
been formally evaluated, and evidence provided for one clinical situation may 
not apply to others. As an area of controversy, off-label use is subject to the 
contradictory expectations of various stakeholders, including health care pay-
ers, the pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and consumers. The FDA has a 
role in balancing these expectations, but it currently does so primarily through 
regulating corporate marketing.”). 
 128. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006). 
 129. See discussion supra note 63. 
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indicating its change of heart in regards to GRASE drugs.130 In-
itially implementing the GRASE provision would not take 
much more than this because the provision is already in the Act 
and has been mooted by FDA’s own actions in setting the bar 
for achieving GRASE status impossibly high.131 Notably, some 
courts have affirmed FDA’s stringent and limited applicability 
of GRASE for drugs, virtually equating the standard of proof 
required to that required by an NDA also exist.132 However, 
these decisions could also likely be overcome by an FDA-issued 
guidance because of the very deferential approach that courts 
take towards FDA decisions in most cases, especially for 
GRASE, as evidenced by court adoption of FDA’s stringent ap-
proach.133 If FDA did not itself revive GRASE, a court hypo-
thetically could reinvigorate the concept by overruling prece-
dent limiting the doctrine’s applicability.134 However, because 
courts are bound by precedent and are largely deferential to 
FDA,135 this seems a less likely route to revival. 
                                                          
 130. See Guidances, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/guidances/default.htm (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2012) (“Guidance documents represent FDA’s current thinking on a 
topic. They do not create or confer any rights for or on any person and do not 
operate to bind FDA or the public. You can use an alternative approach if the 
approach satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regula-
tions.”). Even taking the relatively conservative approach the FDA officially 
states in regards to guidance documents, the weight of the documents is evi-
dent because they give insight to companies on how FDA feels about issues. A 
company, thus, that follows FDA’s approach in guidance documents is much 
more likely to have a positive experience with the agency than a company that 
disregards the guidance documents. 
 131. JAMES T. O’REILLY, supra note 13, § 13:44. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See discussion, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 134. See generally O’REILLY, supra note 13 (discussing the role of courts in 
adopting FDA’s limited view of the applicability of GRASE for drugs). Thus, 
the same courts could overrule their precedent. This seems less likely, howev-
er, because of judicial deference to FDA, courts’ reluctance to overrule prece-
dent, and the fact that GRASE cases will most likely not even be brought be-
cause of the established precedent which limits the courts ability to make such 
a decision. 
 135. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-
Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 204 (2004) (“When a party ag-
grieved by a federal government agency’s interpretation of a statute or regula-
tion seeks judicial review, the reviewing court typically applies the Chevron 
doctrine and defers to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is reasonable 
and not contrary to the statutory or regulatory text.”) (footnotes omitted). Con-
tra James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial 
Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
939 (2008) [hereinafter Losing Deference] (proposing generally that judicial 
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If GRASE were revived, FDA would need to implement an 
infrastructure to deal with GRASE applications. FDA would 
not have to look far for an example of how to deal with GRASE 
applications because it has a well-functioning system already 
for GRAS food additives.136 In addition, because the GRAS des-
ignation was initially based on GRASE drug concepts,137 apply-
ing the concept back to GRASE is consistent. Using the GRAS 
notification system, a manufacturer who believes its product to 
be GRAS may submit notification of this designation to FDA.138 
FDA then responds to the notification.139 
In a GRASE Notification System, a drug manufacturer 
seeking GRASE status for its drug would submit a notification 
of this designation to FDA. Along with this notification the 
manufacturer would be required to submit its data, either sci-
entific or through experience through usage as provided in the 
Act, showing that its drug meets the requisite general recogni-
tion of safety and efficacy. The standard for general recognition 
would be the same as outlined supra. However, if FDA wanted 
to expand the applicability of GRASE even further, it could re-
lax its requirements of having peer-reviewed studies as evi-
dence of a proposed GRASE drug’s safety and effectiveness. 
Perhaps, a standard could be put in place where at least some 
evidence must be found in a published peer-reviewed journal; 
however, other unpublished studies could be used as supple-
mentary evidence. Employing this system of evidence, FDA 
would still protect consumers while being able to get safe and 
effective drugs to market quickly and at lower costs than cur-
rently possible. Finally, FDA would issue a response within 180 
days and either grant GRASE status or require safety and effi-
cacy to be shown through an NDA. 
For a GRASE Notification System to work, courts would 
have to give less deference to FDA’s safety views when those 
views are contrary to a majority of doctors and scientists.140 An 
                                                          
deference towards FDA may be waning with the popularity of the agency). 
 136. See generally Guidance, supra note 80 (discussing in detail the GRAS 
notification process and describing how one seeking GRAS status can apply for 
it). 
 137. See Degnan, supra note 29, at 556. 
 138. Guidance, supra note 80. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Losing Deference, supra note 135, at 940 (“The judicial deference 
given to the Agency is usually attributed to the FDA’s century-long legacy of 
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outlier’s opinion should not be considered sufficient for estab-
lishing that there is no consensus among the scientific commu-
nity in GRASE designations.141 Accordingly, an FDA scientist 
that expresses doubts about the safety of a drug applying for 
GRASE designations should not prevent the finding of scientific 
consensus. Allowing an FDA scientist’s concerns that have min-
imal, if any, support outside the agency is too deferential to the 
agency. In addition, this level of deference to the view of FDA 
scientists, at the exclusion of the opinions of countless other 
outside and disinterested scientists, affords an opportunity for 
corruption. 
To remedy this deference problem courts should be pre-
sented with the views regarding a drug’s general recognition of 
safety and efficacy of both FDA scientists and outside scien-
tists.142 After hearing from experts with differing views regard-
ing general recognition of safety and efficacy the court could be 
well-informed to weigh the evidence presented and make a rul-
ing as to general recognition. This method, although imperfect 
because many judges are not scientific experts, provides for a 
more neutral and balanced decision regarding general recogni-
tion to be made. 
The GRASE Notification System would allow drug manu-
facturers with drugs that can be shown through either scien-
tific evidence or evidence of common usage to be generally rec-
                                                          
scientific expertise. However, in recent years, the news media has disdained 
the Bush Administration’s political manipulation of the FDA and has ques-
tioned the Agency’s scientific integrity. This criticism of the Administration’s 
political manipulations of the FDA (for the benefit of conservative political 
constituencies) may diminish the willingness of federal judges to defer to our 
nation’s most distinguished regulatory Agency. And if the FDA loses its legacy 
of deference, its ability to regulate efficiently will diminish significantly.”) 
(footnotes omitted). Thus, FDA may be afforded less deference by courts, 
which would diminish FDA’s ability to effectively veto all drugs for which 
GRASE status is being sought. 
 141. See generally O’REILLY, supra note 13, § 13.34 (“[G]uided by the Su-
preme Court’s attitude of deferential acceptance, federal judges declined to 
overturn FDA decisions about ‘general recognition’ despite some sophisticated 
arguments of well-prepared challengers.”). The FDA determination of general 
recognition to which courts have generally deferred may, at least in theory, be 
based on as little as one FDA scientist’s decision that the drug in question 
does not meet the requirements for ‘general recognition.’ 
 142. In fact, GRAS status can be shown independently of government by 
outside experts. See How U.S. FDA’s GRAS Notification Program Works, 
FDA.GOV (Jan. 2006), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodIngredientsPackaging/Ge
nerallyRecognizedasSafeGRAS/ucm083022.htm. Thus, if independent experts 
are used for GRAS designations, so too, should they be used for GRASE. 
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ognized as safe and effective to get to market without having to 
go through the NDA process. Because of the time and cost asso-
ciated with the NDA process, drugs qualifying for the GRASE 
notification system would get to market more quickly and at a 
lesser expense.143 In addition, the drug getting to market would 
still be safe and effective for its proposed use because it would 
have to satisfy the stringent requirements of general recogni-
tion of safety and efficacy.144 The general recognition showings 
have actually been equated to the safety and efficacy proof 
needed for an NDA application.145 
If the aforementioned changes were implemented, the 
GRASE Notification System could afford a useful alternative 
for getting a drug to market. A similar standard is used in the 
GRAS system and has not rendered the GRAS concept ineffec-
tive for food additives.146 
2. Support for revival of GRASE 
Revival of the GRASE concept for drugs finds support in 
the concept’s presence in the Act. Various canons of statutory 
interpretation echo the importance of the inclusion of the 
GRASE concept in the statute. For example, when engaging in 
statutory interpretation, courts aim to make the entire statute 
effective.147 In addition, the canon against surplusage provides 
that a part of the statute should not be made ineffectual by the 
statutory reading.148 To comply with these canons of interpre-
tation, a court should give renewed effect to the GRASE provi-
                                                          
 143. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of the costs associated with drug 
development and the NDA process for an illustration of the great potential 
savings of a GRASE designation. 
 144. This would be very similar to the existing GRAS system which en-
sures safety. The GRASE system would not only ensure safety, but would also 
ensure drug efficacy for the proposed usage. 
 145. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 146. See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the requirement of 
‘general recognition’ for both GRAS and GRASE together); see also GRAS No-
tice Inventory, supra note 82 (a listing of GRAS foods, which is still currently 
being added to, which shows how the GRAS designation is still applicable to-
day). 
 147. Catherine E. Vance, Some Canons of Statutory Construction, 
WHEELING JESUIT U. (2005), http://procom.wju.edu/347/347unit1 
/canonsStatConst/CLLA-canons-of-statutory-construction.pdf (citing Negon-
sott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993)). 
 148. Id. (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 
472 U.S. 237 (1985)). 
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sion of the Act, because the current interpretation of GRASE, 
which has basically rendered it inoperative, violates the can-
ons. Thus, FDA could rely on these canons of interpretation in 
changing its interpretation of GRASE. 
Using the GRAS system to inform the GRASE Notification 
System also finds support in the canons of statutory construc-
tion. The internal consistency canon supports the proposal that: 
Every part of a statute must be viewed in connection with the whole 
so as to harmonize all parts, if practicable, and give sensible and in-
telligent effect to each, for it is not to be presumed that the legislature 
intended any part of a statute to be without a meaning.149 
Thus, the fact that FDA has implemented a GRAS notification 
system supports the employment of a similar system for 
GRASE drugs because both concepts fall within the Act. In ad-
dition, the GRAS provision was based on the GRASE provi-
sion,150 which further supports the applicability of FDA’s inter-
pretation of GRAS to GRASE. 
Although foods are arguably less dangerous, overall, than 
drugs are, the GRAS system is still a good model for a potential 
GRASE system. FDA could employ the same standards for 
“general recognition” for both GRAS and GRASE. However, in 
implementing a GRASE system, FDA would require applicant 
drugs to establish both general recognition of safety and effica-
cy.151 Thus, by the very nature of the different requirements 
that food additives and drugs must meet to attain GRAS or 
GRASE status, respectively, the higher potential risk associat-
ed with drugs is addressed. 
Further support comes from the fact that GRASE is still 
used in certain cases for OTC drugs.152 If a showing of general 
recognition of safety and efficacy is sufficient to get some OTC 
drugs recognized as GRASE,153 then it follows that the same 
should be allowable for prescription drugs. In addition, the in-
herent risks of danger between OTC drugs and prescription 
drugs are closer than the risk between drugs and food; thus, 
those not persuaded by the use of GRAS in food additives could 
                                                          
 149. Id. (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 
774 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
 150. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 151. By adding the requirement of efficacy, GRASE drugs would be subject 
to a high standard for qualification. See Rajesh Yelugoila, GRASE Grandfa-
thered and DESI Drugs, REG.ONE (Mar. 23 2012), http://www.regulatoryone.co
m/2012/03/grase-grandfathered-and-desi-drugs.html. 
 152. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the use of OTC Drug Monographs). 
 153. ABOOD, supra note 14, at 73. 
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be satisfied with this argument. 
3. How Application of the GRASE Concept Could Lower Drug 
Development Costs 
A GRASE Notification System could help decrease the high 
cost of getting certain drugs to market in the United States. 
First, for drugs that meet the requirements of “general recogni-
tion of safety and efficacy,” the costs associated with research 
and development as well as FDA approval would be drastically 
decreased.154 This voluntary system would cost much less than 
the filing of an NDA.155 In addition, the time to get the drug on 
the market would be much shorter, because manufacturers of 
GRASE drugs would not be subject to the lengthy and costly 
NDA process.156 
With a GRASE Notification System, FDA would still be 
getting information from the drug manufacturers on the safety 
and efficacy of drugs. FDA could also exercise its input via the 
notification response or seizure actions if the agency believes 
that the drug is misbranded as GRASE.157 Thus, unlike other 
proposals for decreasing the time and cost associated with get-
ting a drug to market, notably off-label prescribing, the safety 
and efficacy of the GRASE drug for the particular use would be 
shown. 
However, if FDA wanted to expand the applicability of 
GRASE even further, it could relax its requirements of having 
peer-reviewed studies as evidence of a proposed GRASE drug’s 
safety and effectiveness.158 Perhaps a standard could be put in 
place where at least some evidence must be found in a pub-
lished peer-reviewed journal; however, other unpublished stud-
                                                          
 154. See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 1 (describing GRASE as “an alter-
native to the expense of [a] new drug application.”). 
 155. See id. (“This status [GRAS or GRASE] can save its holders millions in 
approval costs, not to mention the time that those processes take.”). 
 156. See id. (highlighting both the financial and time saving benefits of 
GRAS and GRASE status). 
 157. See 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (2006) (providing for the ability to seize adul-
terated and misbranded drugs in interstate commerce). 
 158. See O’REILLY supra note 13, §13.33 (“Drug GRASE claims are very 
difficult to win over FDA’s objections. An absence of published peer journal 
articles about a compound ‘is proof that the requisite general recognition does 
not exist.’”). Thus, if FDA changed its position and no longer required peer-
reviewed journal articles, at least theoretically, more drugs could qualify for 
GRASE status. 
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ies could be used as supplementary evidence. Employing this 
system of evidence, FDA would still protect consumers while 
being able to get safe and effective drugs to market quickly and 
at lower costs than currently possible. 
Another benefit stemming from a GRASE revival could be 
getting more drugs to market that manufacturers do not want 
to spend the money getting approved through the NDA pro-
cess.159 By having a cheaper alternative to the NDA processes, 
drug manufacturers would have more impetus to produce drugs 
that do not have as much economic promise, like drugs for rare 
diseases.160 Despite the small profit margin for drugs for rare 
diseases, getting these drugs on the market as GRASE would 
be profitable to manufacturers because they would have less 
research and development and approval costs to redeem.161 
Accordingly, a GRASE drug manufacturer may be able to 
offer the drug at a lower cost to patients.162 Overall, the revival 
of the GRASE concept would help alleviate the high cost asso-
ciated with getting a drug to market for certain drugs, while 
still affording the safety and effectiveness information needed 
by FDA to ensure that the drug is acceptable for use by Ameri-
can consumers. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Getting a drug to market is a lengthy and expensive pro-
cess in the United States. This problem has a wide range of im-
                                                          
 159. See generally discussion supra Part I.D (fast-tracking FDA programs). 
These programs were instituted to provide economic incentives for the devel-
opment of drugs that would not otherwise be profitable for companies to pro-
duce. Thus, because GRASE would provide a less expensive alternative to the 
NDA process, it could stimulate drug companies to produce drugs that would 
not have been financially rewarding if the NDA process had to be followed. 
 160. See, e.g., discussion supra Part I.D (discussing fast-tracking and other 
economic incentives given to drug companies that develop drugs for uncom-
mon diseases or for diseases predominantly affecting the poor). Because 
GRASE offers economic benefits, it could operate as a similar process to incen-
tivize drug development that might not otherwise occur. 
 161. See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 10, at 1 (describing GRASE as a cost ef-
fective alternative to the NDA process); see also Eric Kimbuende et al., Pre-
scription Drug Costs, KAISEREDU.ORG (Feb. 2010), http://www.kaiseredu.org/ 
Issue-Modules/Prescription-Drug-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx (“Manufactur-
ers try to recoup the research and development, costs for drugs that make it to 
the market as well as those that do not enter the marketplace.”). 
 162. Kimbuende et al., supra note 161 (describing how drug manufacturers 
try to recover the money spent on drug development and illuminating how one 
consequence has been increased cost of pharmaceuticals for consumers). 
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plications for America’s public health and its economy. Public 
health implications include a low incentive for manufacturers 
to develop drugs for the treatment of diseases affecting the poor 
and for rare diseases. On the economic front, a manufacturer 
that goes through the FDA drug approval process may end up 
charging consumers more for its product in an attempt to pass 
on its costs. 
The current solutions for this problem, both those proposed 
and those implemented, fail to adequately assure either the 
safety and/or effectiveness of the drugs that would avoid the 
NDA process. However, reviving the GRASE concept, enumer-
ated in 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1), would lower the cost of getting 
certain drugs to market without compromising the safety and 
effectiveness data provided about the drug. The proposed re-
vival of the GRASE concept would employ a system similar to 
the notification system for GRAS food additives, with less def-
erence to FDA and a relaxation on the requirement for exclu-
sively published, peer-reviewed supporting articles. Through 
this system, GRASE drugs would be able to avoid both a large 
portion of the expensive research and development process as 
well as the user fee associated with filing an NDA with FDA. 
Attaining a GRASE designation would save drug manufactur-
ers both time and money. The savings could be passed on to 
consumers, increasing access to the medication. In addition, the 
availability of this lower-cost alternative to the NDA process 
could create greater incentive for the development of drugs that 
commonly have a small grossing market. Thus, reviving the 
GRASE concept could also help to reduce current disparities in 
healthcare. 
 
 
 
 
 
